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Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing 
Countries Equitably and Effectively 
Daniel Watts 
INTRODUCTION 
As negotiators from 192 nations gathered in Copenhagen, December 
2009, fifty-six of the world’s newspapers published an urgent editorial in 
forty-five different countries.1 The editorial called for “decisive action” on 
climate change, and admonished participating nations “not to hesitate, not 
to fall into dispute, not to blame each other but to seize opportunity from the 
greatest modern failure of politics.”2 The editorial soberly cautioned that 
failure to reach consensus “would parch continents, turning farmland into 
desert. Half of all species would become extinct, untold millions of people 
would be displaced, whole nations would be drowned by the sea.”3 
The conference in Copenhagen is now largely recognized as a failure.4 In 
the words of the former executive secretary of the United Nation’s 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “the window of 
opportunity that we have to come to grips with this issue is closing faster 
than it was before.”5 This reflects the ossified patterns of human behavior 
and thought that perpetuate climate change6 and illustrates that the shift to a 
low-carbon economy will require massive thawing of crystallized industrial 
forces. 
International environmental laws aimed at controlling greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions should seek to improve the relationships between human 
groups and their physical, social, and natural environment. Whereas the 
policies of environmental effectiveness and environmental justice are 
frequently at odds, the reality is that one policy cannot be achieved without 
the other. The second Kyoto commitment period will require significant, 
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binding agreements from both developed and developing nations in order to 
be effective. But such agreements will not be forthcoming if they are unjust. 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) 
is a new UNFCCC program intended to address the growing problem of 
GHG emissions caused by deforestation. Deforestation is the second largest 
source of anthropogenic GHG emissions, and it is the largest source of 
GHG emissions in developing nations.7 Consequently, it is generally 
accepted that no meaningful climate change commitment can be achieved 
without a REDD program.8 Further, since it is aimed at deforestation 
emissions as opposed to industrial emissions,9 REDD is the only plausible 
means to bind developing nations to environmentally effective emissions 
caps. And binding developing nations to emissions targets will both 
dramatically improve the environmental effectiveness of the next climate 
change treaty and make the terms more palatable to developed nations like 
the United States. 
Roughly 20 percent of global GHG emissions are due to deforestation in 
developing countries.10 Further, deforestation carries tremendous 
environmental consequences aside from GHG emissions. Half of the earth’s 
tropical forests are now gone and deforestation marches on at a rate of one 
acre per second.11 Deforestation has lead to mass extinction due to loss of 
habitat.12 Deforestation has led to outbreaks of mosquito-borne diseases, 
such as dengue fever, rift valley fever, and malaria; and deforestation has 
led to outbreaks of water-borne diseases, like cholera.13 Deforestation has 
also caused the cultural collapse of forest-dependent people by displacing 
them from their ancestral homelands.14 Finally, soil degradation and water 
shortages due to deforestation greatly contribute to the modern problem of 
famine, refugees, failed states, and terrorism.15 
The major forces driving deforestation are economic. The inclusion of 
emissions trading in the REDD program has the potential to redirect those 
economic forces towards more sustainable forestry and conservation. At the 
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very least, emissions trading under REDD will alleviate the economic losses 
caused by forest conservation in developing countries. 
Unfortunately, the existing design of emissions trading under Kyoto 
utilizes a “baseline” emissions-capping approach that is unrealistic and 
unfair to developing nations.16 Another capping approach, the “carbon-
stock” method, has been proposed to specifically address REDD emissions 
trading.17 The carbon-stock method is more realistic for developing nations, 
but it fails to provide an effective incentive to slow the rate of deforestation. 
Furthermore, neither capping method accounts for the environmental 
services that all nations receive from the preservation of forests. 
This article proposes an emissions market design intended to address the 
shortcomings of existing proposals. Part I outlines the specific dangers to 
human health and prosperity posed by climate change and, in particular, the 
dangers of doing little to slow current climate trends. Part II examines 
international responses to climate change and the circumstances which have 
made it difficult to achieve policies that are both environmentally effective 
and environmentally just. Part III describes the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) which, historically, has been used 
to address the gaping social inequities between the nation-stakeholders of 
climate change mitigation. In particular, Part III addresses the 
misconceptions that have made the principle of CBDR an obstacle to 
international consensus. Part IV examines the current avenues by which 
rapidly industrializing developing nations may participate in international 
efforts to mitigate climate change and the limitations of these avenues. Part 
V introduces the REDD initiative, its potential for sweeping change, the 
existing market designs proposed to integrate it into emissions trading, and 
the flaws of those designs. Part VI outlines my market designs for better 
integration of REDD into the emissions-trading market. Finally, I conclude 
that, despite many challenges, a just and effective consensus-based, 
international solution to climate change can be reached. 
822 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
I. CONSEQUENCES: THE STAKES 
Every age has its Cassandras.18 But, before now, mankind has never been 
capable of disrupting human life and prosperity on a global scale and for 
generations hence through sheer inertia and procrastination. 
Heat-trapping GHGs are emitted as a result of a wide range of human 
activity and natural phenomena occurring around the globe.19 Unlike other 
air pollutants, GHGs spread throughout the atmosphere and remain there for 
hundreds of years.20 Rising temperatures threaten to upset a myriad of 
natural processes that support human and other life all over the globe.21 
Therefore, any environmentally effective response to climate change must 
be both consensus-based and international in scope. 
Global warming will necessarily affect all nations of the world. But the 
impact of that effect will differ—sometimes dramatically—among different 
nations.22 All estimates point to the conclusion that poorer nations will 
suffer disproportionately severe injuries from global warming.23 And, while 
wealthy nations are far from insulated, the extent of the U.S. investment in 
the second Kyoto commitment period will depend on the nature and extent 
of the risks avoided by its participation. 
A. Economic Consequences 
The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (hereinafter, “the 
Stern Review”) is the most comprehensive synthesis of data concerning the 
economic impacts of climate change. Furthermore, unlike similar reports, 
the Stern Review takes into account the probability of “extreme weather 
events” and “threshold effects.”24 The Stern Review indicates that global 
temperatures are likely to rise by two to three degrees Celsius within the 
next fifty years.25 But temperatures could rise as much as five to six degrees 
Celsius due to feedbacks that amplify climate change, such as the release of 
GHGs from thawing permafrost.26 Obviously, the scope of the damage 
caused by climate change tends to intensify with the extent of the warming. 
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With that in mind, it is certain that any rise in global temperatures is 
likely to affect the essential components of human life and enterprise 
around the world—namely, water, food, health, land, and environment.27 
Further, increased temperatures threaten to trigger large-scale events, like 
the collapse of Atlantic thermohaline circulation.28 Finally, and certainly the 
most difficult to capture through modeling, is the possibility for 
environmental damage of one kind to combine with others and thereby 
intensify the overall damage. For instance, rising sea levels may displace 
millions of people (land), who migrate to an area where they intensify food 
shortages (food), and over-stress the septic capacity (water), thereby 
increasing diarrheal diseases (health). 
Globally, the economic costs of inaction will be the equivalent of a 5 
percent loss of GDP now and forever.29 But, again, the distribution of that 
economic loss is likely to be disproportionately borne by poorer countries. 
In fact, climate change may initially have some positive effects, in terms of 
increased food production and decreases in winter mortality at higher 
latitudes, where most developed nations are located.30 But these advantages 
will disappear as temperatures continue to rise.31 Plus, any increase of 
global temperature will increase the number and severity of extreme 
weather events, like hurricane Katrina in the United States and the European 
heat wave of 2003.32 The costs of climate change in developed nations are 
likely to exceed several percent of GDP with the increase of extreme 
weather events.33 Further, the uncertain combinations of environmental 
damage in developing nations may lead to global political instability and 
market contagion, thereby increasing costs for developed nations.34 
B. Failed States 
Two groups, The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, track and rank the political wellbeing of nation states 
according to twelve indicators.35 The environmentalist Lester R. Brown has 
identified alarming trends of freshwater shortages, topsoil degradation, and 
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other effects of climate change in the twenty most politically ill nations.36 
Unsurprisingly, these trends contribute greatly to famine locally and to the 
steady rise of grain prices globally.37 Local food shortages are simply a 
prelude for the emerging global food shortage. Rises in the price of grains 
and rice are now understood to be trend driven. According to Brown, food 
shortage in the top twenty failing states is likely to overturn the proverbial 
applecart, creating chaos, terrorism, piracy, increased problems with drugs 
and weapons, and refugees.38 The most severe convergence of local and 
global drivers of famine has yet to occur. However, according to the World 
Bank, 175 million South Asians subsist on grain produced from water 
sources that will soon be exhausted.39 And, China’s grain and rice crops 
also show diminishing yields as more aquifers run dry each year.40 
C. Provisional Conclusion 
Developed nations may initially benefit from rising temperatures due to 
climate change. But they will succumb to the same dangers facing 
developing nations as temperatures continue to rise.41 In the meantime, 
developing nations will suffer certain severe economic loss, and may suffer 
the bitter fruits of failed states, disease, political extremism, and violence, if 
nothing is done. 
II. SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
There is an emerging scientific consensus regarding the existence and 
dangers of climate change.42 Unfortunately, it has not settled the policy 
debate about what should be done, when, and by whom.43 Many nations in 
the international community claim that the United States’ willingness to 
stonewall on a range of policy issues has undermined the otherwise 
international effort.44 However, the failure to shape an effective 
international consensus is not entirely due to a lack of political will and 
statecraft in the United States.45 Achieving global consensus on an effective 
global strategy is a titanic undertaking. The policy issues that the United 
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States typically raises are highly relevant. But the United States has 
generally been inflexible and unwilling to negotiate.46 Historically, U.S. 
involvement in the international effort to stabilize climate change has been 
wholly symbolic. 
Policies are shaped largely according to data. The quality of a policy is 
intrinsically linked to the quality of information upon which that policy is 
based. Climate change science poses a number of challenges due to the 
complexity of the problem.47 Further, due to the array of influential 
interested parties, gathering data that are free from bias is a constant 
concern.48 The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded 
by the United Nations in 1988 to provide policymakers with objective, 
relevant, and up-to-date scientific data on climate change.49 The IPCC 
gathers the most relevant, peer-reviewed, scientific, social, and economic 
literature available and synthesizes the data in comprehensive reports.50 In 
1990, the IPCC released its first report, which was instrumental in the 
establishment of the UNFCCC.51 
The UNFCCC is a “framework” treaty that is intended to be augmented 
and amended over time as better information becomes available.52 Its 
significance was largely symbolic because it set no mandatory limits for the 
reduction of GHGs. However, it did provide periodic updates (called 
“protocols”) that set mandatory emissions caps.53 Following the release of 
the IPCC’s Second Assessment Report in 1995, the UNFCCC member 
nations began work on the first of its protocols: the Kyoto Protocol. 
Adopted by the UNFCCC in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol set mandatory 
limits on the production of six GHGs.54 The United States signed the Kyoto 
Protocol, but never ratified it. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol was never sent to 
the Senate for ratification.55 Anticipating a vote on the protocol, the Senate 
unanimously passed Senate Resolution 98, which resolved that the United 
States should not be a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol or any thereafter, 
which would “either mandate emissions reductions from developed nations 
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without similar commitments from developing nations, or would result in 
serious harm to the economy of the U.S.”56 
In 1998, the Clinton administration commissioned an analysis of the costs 
and benefits of complying with the Kyoto Protocol, which determined that 
the benefits far outweighed the costs.57 Later that year, the House 
Committee on Science commissioned a second cost-benefit analysis from 
the U.S. Department of Energy based on its National Energy Modeling 
System (the “NEMS 1998 Report”).58 That analysis found that compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol had the potential to cause serious harm to the U.S. 
economy.59 The controversy between the two cost-benefit analyses was 
never settled, however, because U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol 
was rejected on other grounds. That is, since developing nations are not 
required to reduce their GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, 
ratification by the 1998 Senate was impossible because of Senate 
Resolution 98. The vast majority of UNFCCC participants—183 of the 192 
member nations—ratified Kyoto.60 The United States was not among them. 
Nevertheless, the United States is still a member nation of the UNFCCC 
and participates in the UNFCCC’s annual Conferences of the Parties (COP). 
The COP is the supreme policymaking body of the UNFCCC.61 In 2005, the 
UNFCCC began to negotiate policy for the second Kyoto commitment 
period in Montreal. In 2007, the COP met in Bali, where U.S. negotiators 
rejected proposals by other member nations to set mandatory emissions 
reduction targets at the outset of the negotiations.62 But the United States 
ultimately agreed to adoption by consensus for a framework for future 
negotiations wherein mandatory targets would be set for industrialized 
nations.63 Copenhagen was intended to produce those mandatory targets. 
On March 25, 2009, the Obama administration began a series of forums 
with fifteen of the world’s wealthiest nations, ostensibly to create a “candid 
dialogue” between developed and developing nations to “advance the 
exploration of concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply 
of clean energy while cutting greenhouse gas emissions.”64 As the 
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Copenhagen UNFCCC negotiations approached, the United States appeared 
to be a willing participant at the bargaining table. But the policy concerns 
that prevented ratification in 1998 persisted. The United States’ willingness 
to participate in the second Kyoto commitment period depended on whether 
the covenants therein were “environmentally effective” and “economically 
sustainable.”65 According to U.S. negotiators, environmental effectiveness 
requires that all the world’s largest emitters (including developing nations, 
like China) make firm commitments to reduce emissions.66 Further, the 
UNFCCC must develop and bring to the market clean-energy technologies 
at a cost that nations can justify to their citizens.67 As we approach 
negotiations in Mexico, we face the same obstacles. 
III. JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The parties to the UNFCCC treaty are divided into three groups: (1) 
Annex I parties, (2) Annex II parties, and (3) Non-Annex I parties.68 Annex 
I parties are industrialized nations that were members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) in 1992, and 
nations with Economies in Transition (EIT). Annex II nations are the same 
as Annex I nations excluding the EIT nations—that is, Annex II nations are 
the wealthiest and most stable of the Annex I nations. Finally, Non-Annex I 
nations are the developing member nations of the UNFCCC.69 
The obstacles to international consensus are economic,70 technological,71 
diplomatic,72 historical,73 and natural.74 While it is beyond the scope of this 
article to address all obstacles, international policymakers who lose sight of 
the big picture do so at their own peril. It may be impossible to attain 
optimal balance of all the competing policies. But, policymakers should not 
be too eager to sacrifice one policy for another. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I nations make mandatory 
commitments, but Non-Annex I nations participate on a strictly voluntary 
basis.75 This policy is based on a principle called “common but 
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differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), which is a novel principle in 
international law that is peculiar to environmental treaties.76 This principle 
of differentiated responsibilities appears structurally unfair because duties 
do not flow to all parties. This imbalance is aggravated by the fact that 
certain developing nations, like China and India, are also among the largest 
emitters.77 This policy was intended to build consensus by making it easier 
for developing nations to ratify the treaty, but it proved to be a policy 
mistake.78 First, the United States refused to ratify Kyoto based, nominally, 
on this policy.79 Second, considering the speed at which developing nations 
are industrializing, this policy was simply not environmentally effective.80 
However, as a practical issue and as a matter of simple justice, developing 
nations are unable to undertake the same kind of commitments that 
developed nations assume under Kyoto.81 Therefore, some incarnation of 
CBDR must be preserved. 
A. Normative Implications 
Internationally, there is a growing consciousness of the biological, 
economic, and human costs of inaction.82 But even as the fog of ignorance 
clears, academic mediocrity and ideology threaten to perpetuate inertial 
human thought and behavior. Principal among the phalanx of mediocrity is 
the positivistic ideology that rejects the international environmental policy 
of CBDR.83 
Facially, an agreement wherein duties do not flow proportionately to all 
parties seems unfair. However, when viewed in context, the principle of 
CBDR prevents far more unfairness than it causes. That is, it would be 
fundamentally unfair to hobble the economic development of poorer nations 
by imposing environmental mandates that did not exist when Annex I 
nations developed their own economies. And it is fundamentally unfair to 
fill the atmosphere with our wastes and then cry foul when Non-Annex I 
nations begin to industrialize. 
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Furthermore, when placed in the proper context, it is clear that there are 
other moral considerations that far outweigh the superficial issue of facial 
fairness. The de facto suppression of Non-Annex I economies is 
unjustifiable where people are suffering from malnutrition, disease, and 
illiteracy at rates that are morally unacceptable. Describing all of the 
possible normative considerations that support the application of the 
principle of CBDR is beyond the scope of this article. Articles of high 
quality concerning this subject already exist. One of the earliest and most 
influential articles following the establishment of the UNFCCC was written 
by Henry Shue. Shue’s article, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury 
Emissions, provides an analytical context for environmental policymaking 
at the international level, which rejects “[a]ny strategy of maintaining 
affluence for some people by keeping other people at or below subsistence” 
as “patently unfair . . . extraordinarily unequal—intolerably unequal.”84 
B. Corrective Justice Implications 
Corrective justice is also implicated by the principle of CBDR.85 The 
argument is that, since Annex I nations are responsible for most of the 
existing stock of anthropogenic carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, they are 
morally responsible for correcting the problem.86 Further, since climate 
change is likely to cause disproportionate injury to developing (Non-Annex 
I) nations, the responsible Annex I nations should compensate developing 
nations for damages.87 Initially, corrective justice is an attractive rationale 
for applying the principle of differentiated responsibilities. One could argue 
that the responsibilities of Annex I and Non-Annex I nations under an 
international agreement should reflect the damages that are owed to 
developing nations by Annex I nations. 
However, corrective justice arguments are difficult to sustain in the 
context of international relations. As Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein points 
out in Climate Change Justice, the weakness of the corrective justice 
argument in international relations is due to four considerations, which 
830 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
essentially parallel the basic tort inquiry.88 First, corrective justice assumes 
a culpable agent or entity. Annex I nations are the culpable agents in the 
calculation of corrective justice. But most of the GHGs in the atmosphere 
were emitted by Annex I citizens who are now dead. So, if the costs of 
remedying climate-change injuries are shifted to Annex I nations, most of 
the payers will be paying damages that are disproportionately high in 
comparison to their actual emissions. Further, the damages paid would be 
drawn under a tax structure that does not account for individual GHG 
emissions. So, again, citizens who have emitted little will pay the same as 
those who have emitted a lot. Posner and Sunstein refer to this as “the 
wrongdoer identity problem.”89 
Second, corrective justice assumes an injured victim or entity. Although 
Non-Annex I nations will be the early victims of climate change, most of 
the victims live in the future. Further, the injuries might only be suffered by 
a small proportion of Non-Annex I citizens whereas the damages would be 
distributed equally among all citizens (if at all). Posner and Sunstein refer to 
this as “the victim/claimant identity problem.”90 
Third, corrective justice assumes that the culpable agent’s wrongdoing 
actually caused the injuries sustained by the victim. If a citizen of a Non-
Annex I nation dies from malaria, there may be a direct link between the 
malaria and global warming arising from GHG emissions. But proving that 
such a link exists with any degree of accuracy would be impossible. So, in 
the context of climate change, causation might pose an evidence problem 
that would effectively preclude correction. Posner and Sunstein refer to this 
as “the causation problem.”91 
Finally, corrective justice assumes a culpable state of mind—
negligence.92 Under the present paradigms of negligence, only those 
emissions that occurred after the achievement of scientific consensus would 
be negligent.93 That is, the emitters of GHGs cannot be held negligent for 
emissions that occurred before the dangers of climate change were known. 
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Thus, the vast majority of injurious emissions are not actionable. Posner and 
Sunstein refer to this as “the culpability problem.”94 
For those of us who are inclined to take responsibility for the damages 
caused by our nation’s industrialization, Posner and Sunstein’s arguments 
ring hollow. Whatever weaknesses may exist in corrective justice rationales 
for CBDR under our common-law tort analysis, it cannot be denied that we 
have reaped the lion’s share of the benefits from our nation’s GHG-emitting 
activities, and we should therefore internalize the costs. Furthermore, it is 
self-serving, even pedantic, to avoid responsibility by mechanistically 
applying our own common-law analysis, which, not incidentally, did not 
contemplate nations as tortfeasors. 
Writing in a similar vein, Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith attempt to cast 
international cooperation as purely a function of self-interest through the 
application of “game theory.”95 Their scholarship advances the idea that 
neither custom nor treaty can overcome a nation’s self-interest under the 
right circumstances.96 This descriptive analysis of actual international 
positivism is sobering, but there is no reason to advance positivism 
prescriptively. That is, it is irrational to aspire to the way things have been, 
instead of aspiring to the way things should be. As law professor Mark 
Chinen opines, “a descriptive critique is inapposite because rules of law are 
used primarily to evaluate behavior, not describe it.”97 Implicit in 
scholarship of positivism is the idea that any action that is not taken purely 
for reasons of self-interest is foolish and naive. However, Chinen cautions 
that the legitimacy of that evaluation is called into question “if there is a 
broad mismatch between how states actually behave and how their behavior 
is evaluated.”98 Another lesson from Copenhagen is that there may be a 
broad mismatch between the aspirations of corrective justice and the actual 
behavior of the UNFCCC nation states. So, it is unfortunate that corrective 
justice is the sole moral rationale that is usually alluded to in the public 
debate.99 
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C. Distributive Justice Implications 
Distributive justice arguments do not rely on blame. Rather, distributive 
justice recognizes gaping social inequities and prescribes more equitable 
distributions of wealth simply as a matter of course.100 Neoclassical and 
neoliberal economists are likely to reject this argument on principle as 
patently socialist. However, if you are inclined to accept the theory that 
achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth internationally is 
desirable, then the principle of CBDR would be desirable as well. 
But, as Posner and Sunstein point out, if you are inclined to accept the 
righteousness of distributive justice, the differentiation of responsibilities 
under international treaty might not be the most practical means by which to 
achieve optimal distribution.101 Cash payments would get money to poorer 
nations faster and allow those nations to use the funds in the ways that they 
deem fit. Cash payments would also avoid the collateral consequences of 
hurting poor people in rich nations (who are likely to bear much of the costs 
of low emissions caps in their household energy costs) and benefitting 
wealthy people in poor nations (who are likely to be the emitters).102  
For those of us who are so inclined, the distributive justice rationale for 
differentiating responsibilities is valid. But it might not be the most 
effective means to the end of equitable wealth distribution. 
D. Provisional Conclusion 
Justice-based moral arguments for CBDR are powerful and compelling. 
But, if considerations of justice do not suffice as a basis for applying the 
principle of CBDR, certain practical considerations are undeniable. The 
“polluter pays” principle need not be based in fault, but in pragmatism. As 
Henry Shue advocates, “the polluter should pay because this assignment of 
clean-up burdens creates the strongest disincentive to pollute.”103 Further, 
were the Kyoto Protocol to abandon the practice of CBDR, most of the 
Non-Annex I nations would simply be unable to comply.104 Effectively this 
would alienate most or all of the developing nations from the Kyoto 
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Protocol and would be catastrophic to the international effort. Developing 
nations hold the vast majority of the earth’s people and environmental 
resources. The fact that they are developing means that vast numbers of 
human beings are beginning to consume energy, goods, and the natural 
resources that are abundantly available to them (like coal and wood) at rates 
that are likely to grow rapidly during the second Kyoto commitment 
period.105 
These human activities will absolutely create GHGs and will significantly 
intensify climate change.106 The question is, by how much? Alienation of 
the Non-Annex I nations at this stage will undoubtedly frustrate future 
attempts to curb emissions in those nations. So, the participation of 
developing nations in international efforts to stabilize GHG emissions is 
absolutely essential.107 CBDR may appear to strain the generosity of 
wealthy nations, but, in the final analysis, it may be a necessary concession 
to protect our self-interest. 
But, while CBDR is intended to address competing policy issues, it is not 
clear whether it is practical to stabilize GHG emissions while 
simultaneously protecting the growth of new economies. The problem with 
global warming is that it is a global problem: one that will require a 
consensus-based, international legal process in spite of the fact that different 
member nations will necessarily have different interests in reducing 
emissions. For the reasons outlined above, it is clear that, ethically and 
pragmatically, Annex I nations should bear the greatest share of the 
responsibilities. But, developing nations might also have to take significant 
action if the international response is to be effective.108 
The following section describes the current avenues afforded to 
developing nations for participation in Kyoto’s emissions-reduction 
programs. As explained, these avenues are woefully insufficient to achieve 
the goal of environmental effectiveness. 
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IV. CURRENT AVENUES FOR DEVELOPING NATION PARTICIPATION 
Developing countries will continue to industrialize. Inevitably, emissions 
will increase. Developed countries will continue to consume energy, goods, 
and services, which will increase emissions as well. These emissions will 
add to the existing stock of GHG in the atmosphere.109 So, U.S. negotiators’ 
concern that a complete lack of mandatory commitments on the part of 
Non-Annex I nations could undermine the environmental effectiveness of 
the Kyoto Protocol is not without a rational basis.110 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing nations are limited to three 
avenues of participation—all of which are voluntary. First, developing 
nations may initiate their own national GHG mitigation projects. Second, 
developing nations may assist Annex I nations through the Clean 
Development Mechanism. Finally, developing nations may adopt legally 
binding emissions-limitation targets.111 
A. National Mitigation Projects 
National mitigation projects are encouraged by UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) 
which requires: “All Parties, taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional 
development priorities, objectives and circumstances, shall . . . [f]ormulate . 
. . national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing 
measures to mitigate climate change.”112 The Kyoto Protocol Article 10(a) 
reaffirms the requirements of the UNFCCC.113 But the Kyoto Protocol adds 
“in order to achieve sustainable development”114 and Article 10(b)(i) 
specifies the sectors of the economy that are implicated by the rule: 
“energy, transport, and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry, and 
waste management.”115 
Since 1994, several developing nations have successfully implemented 
national GHG mitigation programs, beginning with Costa Rica.116 But such 
national programs are voluntary; thus, the programs are not legally 
enforceable. Further, the nature and extent of mitigation programs in 
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developing nations depends on the funding received from developed 
nations.117 As a result, national mitigation programs in developing countries 
are rare, heterogeneous, and small in scope.118 
B. The Clean Development Mechanism 
The Kyoto Protocol mandates that the Annex I nations reduce their 
aggregate GHG emissions to 5 percent below 1990 levels.119 In the main, 
developed nations meet their targets through national measures. But the 
Kyoto Protocol utilizes several market mechanisms to allow member 
nations to help each other meet their respective goals: (1) the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), (2) Joint Implementation (JI), and (3) 
emissions trading.120 The CDM allows developing nations to assist Annex I 
nations in reaching their emissions targets while simultaneously promoting 
sustainable development in Non-Annex I nations.121 
Codified under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is a rather 
ingenious economic mechanism. As developed nations progress toward 
their target goals, the measures that they must take are likely to become 
increasingly expensive. At a certain point, the expense may cease to be cost-
effective. For example, suppose that an Annex I nation has to limit its 
emissions to five thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide. But the nation has 
projected that it will emit ten thousand metric tons. The nation begins to 
pass regulations for its industrial emitters and, at a cost of $8 million, the 
emitters reduce the nation’s projections to six million tons. But, to cut the 
remaining one thousand tons of carbon dioxide, the industries will have to 
spend $800 million. In the event that an Annex I nation finds that it will be 
cost prohibitive to meet its emissions target, it can fulfill its obligation by 
reducing emissions in a developing nation.122 So, the hypothetical nation 
could conduct a $2 million technology transfer to a developing nation that 
would reduce that nation’s emissions by one thousand tons. In this way the 
Annex I nations can meet their targets efficiently, and developing nations 
can benefit from the project. 
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The CDM requires an extensive certification process to ensure that the 
emissions reductions are “additional to any that would occur in the absence 
of the certified project activity.”123 For this reason CDM projects are easier 
to evaluate than national mitigation projects. Developing nations participate 
in CDM projects on a strictly voluntary basis.124 But participation requires 
only that the developing nation accept the benefit of the CDM project. So, 
the CDM requires much less commitment from the developing nation than 
national mitigation projects. Further, CDM projects exist only when Annex 
I nations encounter difficulty meeting their targets. Consequently, the 
amount and scope of potential CDM projects was dramatically reduced 
when the United States backed out of Kyoto.125 Regardless, the CDM 
projects are usually small and lack the capacity to address the scope of the 
problem.126 
C. Binding Targets Through a Status Change 
For a developing nation to undertake binding emissions targets it must 
successfully change its status from Non-Annex I to Annex I under both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.127 The transitioning party is required to 
petition the COP six months prior to the following COP. At the COP, the 
status can be changed by a consensus or a three-fourths majority vote by the 
member nations.128 
To date, no Non-Annex I nation has successfully transitioned to Annex I 
status. Developing nations that resist being pressured into joining Annex I 
have precluded the amendment of the treaties for the nations that seek to 
transition.129 But, even if a developing nation were able to make the desired 
transition, it is unlikely that it would be able to adopt a Kyoto-style 
emissions cap.130 Under Kyoto, Annex I nations set their emissions caps 
according to emissions levels from a previous year. But developing nations 
are growing so rapidly that to cap their progress in this way would 
unreasonably burden their growth. Also, a would-be transitioning nation is 
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not likely to have the institutional, financial, or technical capacities to 
monitor and enforce an emissions cap.131 
D. Provisional Conclusion 
To review, there are three avenues available for Non-Annex I parties to 
participate in GHG mitigation under Kyoto: national mitigation programs, 
the CDM, and taking on binding targets. National mitigation programs are 
unenforceable, heterogeneous, and difficult to assess. Consequently, the 
environmental effectiveness of such programs is likely to vary widely. The 
CDM is an innovative means by which to encourage sustainable 
development in developing nations and assist developed nations in meeting 
their targets efficiently. Unfortunately, CDM projects are small and 
inadequately incentivized. Binding targets require a long and difficult 
amendment process, which, to date, has wholly precluded developing 
nations from undertaking binding targets.132 
As we approach negotiations in Mexico, we must evaluate these avenues 
candidly. The CDM and the national mitigation projects should be 
preserved because they do not create a disincentive. However, the 
difficulties of transitioning from Non-Annex I to Annex I status are 
counterproductive and should be reformed. Ultimately, these avenues 
simply are not sufficient to address the magnitude of the global warming 
problem. Additional avenues must be opened. The following section 
describes and analyzes the proposed avenue of REDD, which, as explained 
below, has tremendous potential to reduce GHG emissions from developing 
countries if implemented correctly. 
V. A NEW AVENUE FOR DEVELOPING NATION PARTICIPATION: 
REDD 
The UNFCC program REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation) includes an initiative to introduce forestry and land 
use into the Kyoto emissions-trading mechanism.133 Emissions trading is a 
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market-based scheme designed to transfer the burden of reducing emissions 
to the most efficient actors. Emissions trading can only occur in a market 
where emissions have been limited in some way; so, under Kyoto, it is 
currently only available to the Annex I nations that have undertaken binding 
emissions targets. 
Suppose that a private emitter in Japan (emitter J) discovers that, due to 
increased production, it will definitely exceed the emissions permitted to it 
under the Kyoto cap. In order to avoid exceeding its allotted units, emitter J 
can either cut production or invest in novel and expensive proprietary 
technology. Now suppose that there is an emitter in Germany (emitter G), 
which will fall well below its permitted emissions due to technological 
improvements. Under the emissions trading mechanism, emitter J can pay 
emitter G in exchange for the rights to emitter G’s unused emissions. As 
long as the cost of purchasing the rights from emitter G is less than the costs 
of forgoing production or purchasing the new technology, emitter J would 
be wise to make a deal with emitter G. Through emissions trading, the 
economic costs of an emissions cap are minimized, but the efficient actor is 
financially rewarded and the inefficient actor is financially punished. 
Emissions trading is an attractive solution because it mitigates the 
economic costs of reducing emissions. But, both policy goals of 
environmental effectiveness and environmental justice may be undermined 
by the particular design features of a given emissions-trading scheme. For 
example, if the annual cap on emissions is set too high, then emitters will 
not have the economic incentive to reduce their emissions. Or, if the 
emissions cap is set too low, particularly for developing nations, then 
economic growth can be stifled right where it is needed most. 
REDD will utilize the emissions-trading mechanism to stabilize the 
GHGs that result from deforestation. According to the Stern Review, 
deforestation currently accounts for 18 percent of the carbon dioxide 
released annually into the atmosphere.134 This is because forest soils and 
vegetation contain half of the earth’s terrestrial carbon pool.135 The 
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remaining carbon is contained in other life forms, fossil fuels, and the 
oceans. In the global carbon cycle, carbon is exchanged between terrestrial 
ecosystems (forests, for example), and the atmosphere through the 
processes of photosynthesis, respiration, decomposition, and land-use 
changes.136 
When forests are leveled, they (1) cease to absorb carbon dioxide out of 
the atmosphere, (2) release large quantities of carbon dioxide from the soil, 
and (3) release substantial quantities of carbon dioxide from the vegetation 
if it is burned or allowed to decompose.137 
Many of the poorest Non-Annex I nations contain the earth’s great 
tropical forests and REDD is targeted, almost exclusively, at the 
deforestation taking place in these rapidly industrializing nations. Tropical 
forests are particularly important to the earth’s carbon cycles because of 
their photosynthetic capabilities. In fact, tropical forests have been 
analogized to a septic tank for the atmosphere because of the quantities of 
carbon dioxide they absorb.138 According to the IPCC, tropical forests 
absorb and contain more carbon than the temperate and boreal forests 
combined.139 But, for a number of reasons,140 deforestation in the tropics 
occurs at an alarming rate of one acre per second.141 As a result, the 
permanent conversion of forested to non-forested land in developing 
countries is one of the major causes of the accumulation of GHGs in the 
atmosphere.142 Additionally, as more tropical forests are leveled, the earth 
becomes less capable of absorbing GHGs. So, REDD will both prevent 
dangerous emissions and preserve vital environmental services. 
The drivers of deforestation are largely due to subsistence activity, 
which, if capriciously halted, could cause tremendous human hardship. The 
UNFCCC studies of the drivers of deforestation in developing countries 
identify both proximate causes (such as logging, infrastructure 
development, and agriculture),143 and underlying causes (such as public 
policy, institutional weakness, and corruption, as well as weak land tenure 
and property rights).144 
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Poverty and scarce income opportunities can force landless people to the 
forested frontier to clear marginal land for subsistence crops.145 In fact, 
according to the UNFCCC, the single greatest driver of deforestation in 
developing countries is the clearing of land for agriculture.146 Land that is 
appropriate for agriculture is scarce in the tropics. The forested frontier 
provides displaced or unemployed people with land upon which to plant a 
crop or pasture a small herd.147 So, it should be emphasized that avoiding 
deforestation in the tropics literally means preventing human subsistence 
activities in developing nations. 
The UNFCCC has outlined a number of policy approaches to address the 
problem of deforestation in developing countries. Some are preventative, 
such as the effort to reduce prices and demand for forest-related products.148 
Others are punitive, such as the effort to increase the costs and risks of 
deforestation.149 Still other approaches, like the effort to improve land 
tenure rights, address the underlying policy and institutional causes of 
deforestation.150 
So, REDD emissions trading is only one of many incentives aimed at 
slowing deforestation in developing countries. But of all the initiatives, it is 
the only one that will require developing nations to undertake binding 
commitments under an international treaty. Unfortunately, the existing 
Kyoto Protocol did not contemplate binding commitments from Non-Annex 
I nations. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol authorizes the COP to “define 
the relevant principles, modalities, rules, and guidelines, in particular for 
verification, reporting, and accountability for emissions trading.”151 This 
gives the COP broad discretion to shape the emissions-trading market. But 
the existing market design is not suited for Non-Annex I nations and 
avoided deforestation. Under Kyoto, developed nations undertake binding 
reductions of their industrial emissions under Article 3. Developed nations 
are only permitted to engage in emissions trading “for the purposes of 
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3” and only as a supplement to 
domestic emissions-reduction programs. 
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REDD will differ from conventional emissions trading because it will not 
require Non-Annex I nations to limit their industrial GHG emissions in any 
way. Furthermore, the existing emissions-capping scheme, codified under 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, was designed under different assumptions 
and is unsuited to cap deforestation emissions. The following describes 
conventional emissions trading and explains why REDD will require a 
creative new capping scheme if it is to be both environmentally effective 
and environmentally just. 
A. The Baseline Model: Capping Emissions Under Article 3 
The capping method adopted by the COP for the first Kyoto Protocol is 
best described as a “baseline” model. Under the baseline model, Annex I 
nations take on a binding emissions target based on emissions levels from a 
previous year. The emissions level of the year chosen is the baseline. For 
the wealthiest member nations, the baseline year is 1990 and the target is 5 
percent below 1990 levels. For the EIT member nations, the baseline year 
and emissions target vary because many EIT nations’ economies were 
relatively small in 1990.152 
The targets are measured in tons of carbon emissions. Each ton of carbon 
under a baseline cap is equal to one “assigned amount unit” (AAU), which 
the emitter is permitted to emit or sell to another emitter.153 So if Nation 
“Q” emitted thirty thousand tons of carbon into the atmosphere in 1990, it is 
permitted to emit thirty thousand tons of carbon during each year of the 
Kyoto commitment period. If Nation Q emits less carbon than it is allotted, 
say ten thousand tons less, then it can sell all ten thousand tons to Annex I 
nations that failed to meet their baseline targets. 
Additionally, there are three methods under Kyoto by which an Annex I 
nation can earn emissions rights over and above their baseline AAUs. First, 
Annex I nations that participate in the CDM154 will earn additional 
emissions rights for every ton of carbon emissions avoided in Non-Annex I 
nations by a CDM project. The units generated through the CDM are called 
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“certified emission reduction units” (CERs).155 So, if Nation Q were to 
build a wind farm in a Non-Annex I nation, like China, which produced 
power that would otherwise have come from coal, thereby avoiding ten 
thousand tons of carbon emissions, then Nation Q would acquire the rights 
to emit ten thousand tons of carbon or sell ten thousand CERs. 
Second, any Annex I nation that participates in Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects wherein it reduces the emissions of other Annex I nations will earn 
additional emissions rights for every ton of carbon dioxide avoided. Units 
generated through JI are called “emission reduction units” (ERUs).156 So, if 
Nation Q builds a solar power plant in an Annex I nation, like Italy, thereby 
avoiding ten thousand tons of carbon emissions, then Nation Q acquires the 
right to sell ten thousand ERUs or emit ten thousand tons of carbon. 
Third, Annex I nations that participate in land use changes leading to the 
absorption of carbon dioxide through the carbon cycle, such as 
reforestation, earn additional rights for every metric ton of carbon that will 
be absorbed annually by the planted forest through photosynthesis and 
respiration. Units generated through land use and forestry projects are called 
“removal units” (RMUs). So, if Nation Q plants enough trees to annually 
remove ten thousand tons of carbon from the atmosphere, then Nation Q 
will have earned the right to emit ten thousand tons of carbon or to sell ten 
thousand ERUs. 
To implement REDD under the baseline approach, developing nations 
would have to limit their deforestation emissions according to emissions 
from a previous year. For convenience, I will call the allotment of emissions 
rights under the baseline “REDD Units” (“RDUs”) and each RDU will be 
equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide. So, if a Non-Annex I nation does 
not use all of its RDUs, it is free to sell its unused units either to (1) other 
Non-Annex I nations that failed to meet their REDD emissions targets, or 
(2) Annex I nations that failed to meet their industrial emissions targets. 
There are several features of the baseline approach that make it 
unsuitable for REDD. First and foremost, it did not contemplate the erratic 
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rates of deforestation that occur in developing countries. A baseline works 
well for industrial emissions which tend to grow at relatively predictable 
rates.157 Rates of tropical deforestation, on the other hand, tend to ebb and 
flow according to a complex set of factors.158 For example, the Brazilian 
Amazon lost twenty thousand square kilometers of tropical rainforests in 
1988, eleven thousand square kilometers in 1991, twenty-nine thousand 
square kilometers in 1995, and eighteen thousand and one hundred square 
kilometers in 1996.159 So, if the deforestation baseline for Brazil was 
arbitrarily set at 1995 levels of deforestation, the cap may be set too high to 
be environmentally effective. That is, Brazil might have such a glut of 
RDUs that it would have no incentive to slow deforestation during the 
commitment period. If the deforestation baseline was set at 1988 levels, the 
cap may be too low to be environmentally just. That is, Brazil might have 
too few RDUs to allow for human sustenance activities, thereby creating 
unacceptable human hardship among vulnerable communities. 
Second, the Kyoto Protocol requires nations that participate in emissions 
trading to develop monitoring procedures which may be cost prohibitive if 
there is no early money available from the emissions market to pay for it. 
That is, developing nations will have to organize (1) a national system to 
estimate anthropogenic deforestation emissions to set the target, (2) a 
governmental body to monitor and facilitate emissions-trading transactions, 
(3) a national program to educate deforestation-emitters about the program, 
and (4) a system to preserve and protect a certain amount of forest, before 
making any REDD money. The baseline approach assumes that a 
participating nation has the wherewithal to front-load this kind of national 
endeavor. If Brazil is unsure of the kind of returns it will receive from the 
emissions market, it may forgo participation in the emissions market. 
Third, it is unlikely that the baseline approach will replace the income 
provided by deforestation. The value of an emissions-trading unit is set by 
the market and will be negotiated between the private sellers and buyers. 
RDUs will be adding to the other units available on the market, which will 
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lower demand and dilute the value of the trading units. This problem can be 
remedied if Annex I nations agree to undertake radically lower emissions 
caps, but the COP has not yet negotiated the modalities for accounting for 
AAUs.160 
The final problem with the baseline approach involves valuation. Under 
conventional emissions trading, the value of the RDU would be exactly 
equal to the value of the AAU, because both units represent the right to emit 
one ton of carbon. The first reason this is a problem is because the monetary 
valuation of the emissions-trading units does not distinguish between the 
sustenance activity forgone by avoiding deforestation in developing nations 
and the economic activity forgone by avoiding industrial emissions in 
developed countries. As a matter of simple equity, it is unjust to ignore the 
fact that the participation of developing nations comes at much greater costs 
to their human health and prosperity. The emissions market will fail if it 
does not reflect the gaping social inequities between the developed and the 
developing world. 
Furthermore, the equivalence of emissions-trading units in the 
conventional emissions market fails to account for the abundant 
environmental services that are preserved by avoiding deforestation, such as 
biological diversity, water cycle regulation, and soil conservation. 
Biological diversity alone provides humankind with essential medical 
research, maintains the resilience of ecosystems to cope with inevitable 
climate change, and provides potential adaptation measures for reducing 
climate-related losses to agriculture. 
However, the most troubling problem of equating RDU values to AAU 
values is that it fails to account for the environmental service of removing 
GHGs from the atmosphere through respiration and photosynthesis. 
Standing forests in the tropics continue to absorb carbon dioxide, so long as 
they are standing. Millions of square kilometers of tropical forests in 
developing countries are absorbing carbon emissions without compensation. 
This is a public good that goes unrewarded. The value of RDUs must 
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compensate this public good if the carbon market is to be environmentally 
effective. 
A just, practical, and effective emissions market will reflect both the 
gaping social inequities between Annex I and Non-Annex I nations, and the 
tremendous global public goods that accompany the preservation of tropical 
forests. But conventional emissions trading can do neither effectively. 
Thankfully, the emissions market can be made to reflect our shared values. 
The following describes a popular effort to design a more practical and just 
REDD mechanism: the “carbon stock” design. However, this design fails to 
address all of the shortcomings of conventional emissions trading. 
Furthermore, the carbon stock design does not promise to be 
environmentally effective. 
B. The Carbon Stock Model 
The carbon stock model is advocated by the Center for International 
Sustainable Development Law.161 Under this model, developing nations are 
permitted to emit all of the carbon dioxide stored in their forests and soils. 
The cap is limited only to the amount of carbon stored terrestrially within 
the nation’s boundaries. This allows forest landowners to collect on every 
acre of preserved forest.162 
The carbon stock model has several advantages over the baseline 
approach. First, it would mobilize faster investment and capital flows.163 
Rather than post facto, developing nations could begin selling credits 
immediately based on lands that have been set aside for protection. Second, 
the carbon stock method avoids the problem of setting a baseline according 
to a prior year. This would prevent setting arbitrary caps that may be too 
high to be environmentally effective or too low to be environmentally just. 
Finally, by setting a cap based on the entire available stock of forest, the 
carbon stock method is more permissive of the human subsistence activity 
that often drives deforestation in developing countries. 
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So, the carbon stock model would solve the practical problem of 
providing early investment for national emissions monitoring and it would 
better reflect the social inequities between Annex I and Non-Annex I 
nations. However, it accomplishes these goals at great cost to environmental 
effectiveness. The carbon stock model would flood the emissions market 
with millions of fungible RDUs and inevitably dilute the value of all 
emissions units. Further, it would allow developing countries to participate 
in the emissions market without undertaking meaningful, binding emissions 
targets. These features would combine to severely dilute the economic 
incentives of avoiding both deforestation and industrial emissions. That is, a 
developing nation could do nothing to slow deforestation and sell the 
remaining deforestation AAUs for a net gain. And a developed nation could 
continue industrial business as usual because of the availability of 
inexpensive emissions units in a glutted, buyer’s market. 
The baseline model is aligned with the Kyoto Protocol’s modality for 
determining AAUs for emissions trading. But the baseline method is not 
aligned with the principle of CBDR. The carbon stock model is more 
aligned with the principle of CBDR, but it is unlikely to slow the rate of 
deforestation in the tropics. The competing policy concerns of 
environmental effectiveness and environmental justice are poorly served by 
either model. But a just, practical, and effective emissions market can be 
had. The following section describes my proposal for an emissions market 
intended to address the shortcomings of conventional emissions trading, 
without sacrificing environmental effectiveness. 
VI. PROPOSALS 
This article was written with the assumption that pragmatism, not 
orthodoxy, will lead to the best solutions. Plato liked to tell the story of 
Thales, who was so enamored by the stars that he stumbled into a well.164 
Similarly, pure-of-heart ideologues will not solve this problem. Staring into 
the fixed stars of their ideals, they will fail to see what is at their very feet. 
Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing Countries 847 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010 
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, ideology must not be ignored and the 
failure in Copenhagen also reflects our collective naivety. As the editorial 
posited, the transition to a low-carbon economy “will require a feat of 
engineering and innovation to match anything in our history. But whereas 
putting a man on the moon or splitting the atom were born of conflict and 
competition, the coming carbon race must be driven by a collaborative 
effort to achieve collective salvation.”165 After the failure of Copenhagen, 
the insight of this mandate is more acute. That is, the transition to a low-
carbon economy will require degrees of both credulity and skepticism. It is 
now clear that we must be skeptical enough to harness the forces of self-
interest, but credulous enough to devote them, not only to our own 
prosperity, but also to that of human beings who live in other regions of the 
world, and who have not yet been born. 
Conventional emissions trading fails to provide developing nations with 
the capital needed to build the institutions to monitor their emissions trading 
and deforestation activities. Conventional emissions trading also fails to 
account for the tremendous amount of carbon that standing tropical forests 
annually remove from the atmosphere. The practical problem of raising 
early capital could easily be addressed if Annex I nations simply made cash 
payments to Non-Annex I nations in exchange for this quantifiable 
environmental service. Voluntary contributions to support REDD have 
already begun, and most REDD advocates hope voluntary contributions will 
suffice as the primary finance mechanism.166 According to the Meridian 
Institute, a phased approach to mobilizing international finance is required. 
But the distributive and corrective rationales for voluntary finance make it 
vulnerable.167 
I propose that developed nations begin to compensate developing nations 
for the environmental services that their forests provide. Early money to 
support REDD could barely begin to account for these services. 
Second, Non-Annex I nations will have to cap their emissions in a way 
that is less arbitrary than the baseline method. The carbon stock method 
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would eliminate binding emissions targets altogether, thereby throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater. In 2006, Kevin Baumert proposed a sensible 
capping method for industrial emissions coming from developing countries. 
Baumert’s method utilizes what he called “action targets,”168 which are 
equally applicable to capping deforestation emissions. 
Action targets are not hard targets. Instead of relying on a baseline that 
may be too high or low, a developing nation would have to show that it took 
measures to prevent a certain number of emissions based on the amount of 
emissions emitted.169 The “target” is not a specific number of tons of 
emissions based on the emissions of a previous year; it is the ratio of 
emissions forgone to emissions emitted. This method requires that the 
nation take progressively more environmentally effective measures to 
reduce emissions and focus on emissions-reduction activities rather than a 
fixed emissions level. Capping emissions in this way effectively 
incentivizes avoiding deforestation without subjecting developing nations to 
the same kind of targets that developed nations undertake. This kind of cap 
is both environmentally effective and environmentally just because it 
requires Non-Annex I nations to undertake binding emissions-reduction 
commitments with a sober understanding of the greater costs to human 
health and prosperity that it entails. 
Finally, the emissions market should not blindly equate industrial AAUs 
with deforestation RDUs. Instead, the market should reflect the fact that 
RDUs not only prevent the release of carbon into the atmosphere but also 
preserve an ecosystem. Placing a dollar value on the preservation of an 
ecosystem is illusory. No one can quantify the value of a potential medicine 
or a potential strain of fruit or vegetable that might be hiding in the great, 
biologically diverse tropical ecosystems of the planet. But the value of an 
RDU when compared with an AAU should reflect this discrepancy in some 
way to better incentivize avoiding REDD emissions. 
Under conventional emissions trading, Annex I nations typically award 
their allotted AAUs to their domestic industries for free. In the future, 
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Annex I nations should be required to auction their AAUs off to their 
industries. This would raise the value of all emissions-trading units. But, 
assuming that RDUs are not auctioned, this would increase the rate of return 
for RDUs relative to AAUs. Designing the emissions market in this way 
gives an advantage to the holder of an RDU, thereby accounting, to some 
degree, for the tremendous environmental services that an RDU represents. 
CONCLUSION 
New thinking and creativity are desperately needed. Market designs 
frequently betray a hierarchy of value placed on the competing policies, so 
that one policy goal is advanced at the expense of another. However, an 
emissions market that is just, practical, and effective can be conceived. The 
salient features of the future emissions market should include: (1) cash 
payments to REDD countries for the carbon removal achieved by their 
tropical carbon sinks, (2) an action target style capping method for RDUs, 
and (3) compulsory auctioning of AAUs to industrial emitters. Since it is 
incentive-based, emissions trading is an appropriate response to global 
climate change in an international arena where command and control would 
be unenforceable. Emissions trading is also appropriate because it mitigates 
the economic costs of reducing GHG emissions most effectively when 
applied to large geographical regions. But the conventional emissions-
trading market is roughly hewn and unsuited for emissions trading with 
Non-Annex I nations. 
By including Non-Annex I nations in emissions trading through REDD, 
the international community can dramatically reduce the environmental 
damage of climate change and the attendant human suffering that it entails. 
However, the competing policies of economic efficiency, environmental 
justice, and environmental effectiveness must be given appropriate weight 
as we design the emissions market of the future. With these policy 
objectives in mind, policymakers can begin to shape a new market where 
poor nations can acquire the needed capital to gain access to the market in 
850 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
exchange for their environmental services; and where wealthy nations can 
continue to reap the tremendous environmental benefits flowing from 
developing nations while simultaneously mitigating the economic costs of 
their commitments more efficiently. 
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